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Abstract.
 UML class diagrams can be used as a language for expressing a con-
ceptual model of a domain. We use the General Ontological Language (GOL) 
and its underlying upper level ontology, proposed in [1], to evaluate the onto-
logical correctness of a conceptual UML class model and to develop guidelines 
for how the constructs of the UML should be used in conceptual modeling. In 
particular, we discuss the UML metaconcepts of classes and objects, power-
types, association and aggregation/composition from an ontological point of 
view. We make some proposals of how to extend version 1.4 of the UML in or-
der to obtain a more satisfactory treatment of aggregation. 
1   Introduction 
Conceptual modeling is concerned with identifying, analyzing and describing the 
essential concepts and constraints of a domain with the help of a (diagrammatic) mod-
eling language that is based on a small set of basic meta-concepts (forming a meta-
model). Ontological modeling, on the other hand, is concerned with capturing the 
relevant entities of a domain in an ontology of that domain using an ontology specifi-
cation language that is based on a small set of basic, domain-independent ontological 
categories (forming an upper level ontology). While conceptual modeling languages 
are evaluated on the basis of their successful use in (the early phases of) information 
systems development, ontology specification languages and their underlying upper 
level ontologies have to be rooted in principled philosophical theories about what 
kinds of things exist and what are their basic relationships with each other.  
Recently, it has been proposed that UML should be used as an Ontology Represen-
tation Language [2,3]. Moreover, in [2] it is argued that although UML lacks a precise 
definition of its formal semantics, this difficulty shall be overcome with the current 
developments made by the precise UML community [4, 5]. We believe, however, that 
defining UML constructs only in terms of its mathematical semantics, although essen-
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tial, it is not sufficient to make it a suitable ontology representation language. The 
position defended here is that, in order to model reality, a conceptual modeling lan-
guage should be founded on formal upper-level ontologies. In other words, it should 
have both, formal and ontological semantics.  
In this paper we use the General Ontological Language (GOL) and its underlying 
upper level ontology, proposed in [1], to evaluate the ontological correctness of a 
conceptual UML class model and to develop guidelines that assign well-defined onto-
logical semantics to UML constructs.  
Due to space limitations we cannot examine all UML constructs here. This paper 
discusses, in particular, the ontological meaning of the UML metaconcepts of classes 
and objects, powertypes, association and part-whole relations (aggrega-
tion/composition). The UML metaconcepts of abstract classes and datatypes are ad-
dressed in a companion paper [6].   
In addition we propose some extensions to version 1.4 of the UML in order to ob-
tain a more satisfactory treatment of part-whole relations. Section 2 introduces the 
basic elements that form the upper level ontology of GOL. Section 3 uses this upper 
level ontology to define the real-world semantics for UML class diagrams for the 
purpose of conceptual modeling. Section 4 discusses some related work. Finally, sec-
tion 5 presents some conclusions. 
2   Basic Elements of the Upper Level Ontology of GOL 
The basic elements of the upper level ontology of GOL can be visually described 
by means of the UML class diagram shown in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1.
 A UML Class Diagram describing the basic concepts of GOL. 
 
2.1   Urelements and Sets  
The main distinction of the GOL-ontology is between urelements and sets. We assume 
the existence of both urelements and sets in the world and presuppose that both the 
impure sets and the pure sets constructed over the urelements belong to the world. 
This implies, in particular, that the world is closed under all set-theoretical construc-
tions. Urelements are entities which are not sets. They form an ultimate layer of enti-
ties without any set-theoretical structure in their build-up. Neither the membership 
relation nor the subset relation can unfold the internal structure of urelements. In 
GOL, urelements are classified into two main categories: individuals and universals. 
There is no urelement being both an individual and a universal. This is expressed in 
GOL by the following axioms:  
∀x (Ur(x) ↔ Ind(x) ∨ Univ(x)) (U1) 
¬∃x (Ind(x) ∧ Univ(x)) (U2) 
2.2   Individuals 
Individuals may be substances, moments, chronoids, or topoids. 
 
Substances and Moments. A substance is that which can exist by itself, or does not 
need another entity in order to exist. Typical examples of substances are: an individual 
person, a house, the moon, a car. Every substance is founded on matter. Substances 
come into existence because the matter is formed in various ways which give rise to 
pieces separated in more or less stable ways from their surroundings and possessing 
qualities of different sorts. 
A moment4 is an individual which can only exist in other individuals (in the way in 
which, for example an electrical charge can exist only in some conductor). Typical 
examples of moments are: a color, a connection, a purchase order. Moments have in 
common that they are all dependent on substances. Some moments are one-place 
qualities, for example color or temperature. But there are also relational moments – 
for example flight connections or purchase orders – which depend on several sub-
stances. 
The inherence relation i – sometimes called ontic predication – glues moments to 
the substances which are their bearers. For example it glues your smile to your face, or 
the charge in a specific conductor to the conductor itself. Substances must bear mo-
ments, and moments must inhere in substances. This is axiomatically expressed as 
follows:  
                                                          
4
 The origin of the notion of moment lies in the theory of individual accidents developed by 
Aristotle in his Metaphysics and Categories. An accident is an individualized property, event 
or process which is not a part of the essence of a thing. We here use the term “moment” in a 
more general sense and do not distinguish between essential and inessential moments. 
Subst(x) → ∃y (Mom(y) ∧ i(y,x)) (SM1) 
∀x (Mom(x) → ∃y (Subst(y) ∧ i(x,y)) (SM2) 
Chronoids and Topoids. Chronoids and topoids are instances of the universals Time 
and Space, respectively. Chronoids can be understood as temporal durations, and 
topoids as spatial regions having a certain mereotopological structure. On one version 
of the theory chronoids and topoids have no independent existence; they depend for 
their existence in every case on the situations which they frame. Every substance x has 
a certain maximal temporal extent, a chronoid which we denote by lifetime(x). The 
substance x exists during lifetime(x). Also, every moment m inhering in x has a 
lifetime, which is such that lifetime(m) ≤ 5 lifetime(x). Moreover, if n is a relational 
moment connecting substances x1,…, xk, then lifetime(n) ≤ lifetime(xi), for i ranging 
from 1 to k. 
2.3   Universals  
A universal is an entity that can be instantiated by a number of different individuals 
which are similar in some respect. Following Aristotle, we assume that the universals 
exist in the individuals (in re) but not independently from them. As a consequence, in 
order to exist, universals must possess instances. 
For every universal U there is a set Ext(U), called its extension, containing all in-
stances of U as elements. It is, however, not the case that every set is the extension of 
a universal (there is no such axiom in GOL). 
There are two kinds of universals that are of particular interest: quality universals, 
such as color and weight, and relational universals, such as flight connection (‘…is 
connected with…’) or purchase (‘…purchases…from…’). Every universal has an 
intension which, in GOL, is captured by means of an axiomatic specification, i.e., a set 
of axioms that may involve a number of other universals representing its essential 
features. A particular form of such a specification of a universal U, called elementary 
specification, consists of a number of universals U1,…,Un and corresponding func-
tional relations R1, …,Rn which attach instances from the Ui to instances of U, ex-
pressed by the following axiom: 
∀a (a::U → ∃e1…∃en
  
∧i≤n(ei ::Ui ∧ Ri(a,ei))) 
The universals U1,…,Un used in an elementary specification are called features. A 
special case of an elementary specification is a quality specification where U1,…,Un 
are quality universals and the instances of U are substances.  
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 In context of this article, the symbols < and ≤ represent the part-of and reflexive part-of rela-
tions, respectively. These relations are discussed in section 2.5. 
Humans, as cognitive subjects, grasp universals by means of concepts that are in 
their head and cannot capture the universals completely, but only as approximate 
views. 
 
Meta-Universals of Finite Order. Ordinary universals are universals of first order 
and the instances of universals of (n+1)-th order are universals of n-th order. Instantia-
tion relations of n-th order are denoted by ::n, and the relation ::1 is also notated as ::. 
Since no universal is a set, it follows that all universals (of whatever order) are urele-
ments.  
2.4   Relations and Relational Universals 
Relations are entities which glue together other entities. Without relations the world 
would fall into many isolated pieces. Every relation has a number of relata or argu-
ments which are connected or related by it. The number of a relation’s arguments is 
called its arity. Relations can be classified according to the types of their relata. There 
are relations between sets, between individuals, and between universals, but there are 
also cross-categorical relations for example between urelements and sets or between 
sets and universals.  
We divide relations into two broad categories, called material and formal, respec-
tively. The relata of a material relation are mediated by individuals which are called 
relators. Relators are individuals with the power of connecting entities; a flight con-
nection, for example, is a relator that connects airports. 
A formal relation is a relation which holds between two or more entities directly – 
without any further intervening individual. Examples of formal relations are: 5 is 
greater than 3, this day is part-of this month, and N is subset of Q. 
 
Holding Relation and Facts. One important formal relation is called the holding 
relation. If r is a relator connecting the entities a1,…,an, n ≥ 1, then we say that r, 
a1,…,an (in this order) stand to each other in the holding relation, symbolically h(r, 
a1,…,an). The fact that h holds directly success to block the obvious regress which 
would arise if a new material relation were needed to tie h to r, a1,…,an, and so on. 
Holding holds directly. 
If r connects (holds of) the entities a1,…,an, then this yields a new individual which 
is denoted by 〈r: a1,…,an〉. Individuals of this latter sort are called material facts. 
A material fact 〈r: a1,…,an〉 has a duration, which depends on the lifetime of the 
relator r. We write 〈r: a1,…,an ; t〉 if t is a chronoid which is a part of the lifetime of r, 
i.e. this fact exists at least during the chronoid t. 
 
Relator Universals. A relator universal is a universal whose instances are relators. 
For every relator universal R there exists a set of facts, denoted by facts(R), which is 
defined by the instances of R and their corresponding arguments. We assume the 
axiom that for every relator universal R there exists a factual universal F = F(R) 
whose extension equals the set facts(R). Take, for example, the relator universal Conn 
whose instances are individual flight connections. Then we may form a factual univer-
sal F(Conn) having the meaning ‘An airport X is connected to an airport Y’ whose 
instances are all facts of the form 〈c:a,b〉, where c is an individual connection and a, b 
are individual airports. 
 
Formal Relations. A formal relation is a relation which holds between two or more 
entities directly – without any further intervening individual. A formal relation may be 
either an extensional relation (i.e. a set) or it may be given by a relational universal 
(having an intension and an extension). If R is a formal relation and [a,b]:R then 
〈R:a,b〉 is called a formal fact. 
2.5   Basic Ontological Relations 
We can distinguish a number of basic ontological relations which form an important 
part of the upper level ontology of GOL. The first and most familiar one is set-
theoretic membership, denoted by ∈. Further basic relations include: 
− the proper and reflexive part-of relations, denoted by < and ≤ 
− the contextual part-of relation, denoted by <U, where the universal U denotes the 
context 
− the holding relation h 
− the inherence relation, denoted by i 
− the instantiation relation, denoted by :: 
− the relational instantiation, denoted by : 
 
 
We discuss some of these basic ontological relations in more detail. 
 
Instantiation. The symbol :: denotes the instantiation relation. Its first argument is an 
individual, and its second a universal. If x::u, then u is a certain time- and space-
independent pattern of features and x is an individual in which this pattern of features 
is realized. x might be, for instance, a molecule of DNA, u a pattern of features shared 
by all exactly similar molecules, where the notion of exact similarity is determined by 
the granularity and point of view of genetic science. The symbol : denotes the rela-
tional instantiation. Its first argument is a list of entities, and its second a relation uni-
versal. Note, that the components of the instantiating list are not necessarily individu-
als. 
 
Part-Whole Relation. There are many different part-whole relations between indi-
viduals. They can be classified by means of the axioms they satisfy. All part-whole 
relations are asymmetric and transitive. In addition to formal part-whole relations, 
there are also material part-whole relations. Part-whole relations may be either proper 
(denoted by <) or reflexive (denoted by ≤). We use the following definitions: 
 
ov(x,y) =df ∃z (z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y)   (overlap) 
x ≤ y =df (x = y ∨ x < y) (reflexive part-whole) 
A proper part-whole relation < is a strict partial order, that is, it satisfies the following 
axioms: 
¬ x < x (irreflexivity) 
x < y → ¬y < x (asymmetry) 
x < y ∧ y < z → x < z (transitivity) 
In addition, it may satisfy some of the following axioms: 
 
x < y  → ∃z (z ≤ y ∧ ¬ov(z,x)) (weak supplementation) 
¬x ≤ y → ∃z (z ≤ x ∧ ¬ov(z,y)) (supplementation) 
(z < x ∧ z < y) → (x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x)  (exclusivity) 
 
 
Contextual Part-Whole Relation. The contextual part-whole relation x <U y has the 
meaning: “U is a universal and x is a part of y in the context of U”. Briefly, if x is a U-
part of y in this sense, then x and y are parts of instances of U and x ≤ y. But more is 
involved, since again the notions of granularity and point of view are an issue. We 
propose the following axiom: for every universal U there are universals U1,…,Un such 
that x <U y implies that x, y are instances of one of the Ui‘s and every instance of one 
of the Ui‘s is part of an instance of U. 
Consider the following example, taken from the domain of biology. Let T be the 
biological universal whose instances are those organisms called trees. Then x <T y 
describes the part-whole relation based on the granularity of the context of whole 
trees. A biologist is interested in describing the structure of trees only in terms of parts 
of a certain minimal size. He is not interested in atoms or molecules. There is a finite 
number of universals {U1,…,Un} by which the biologically relevant parts of trees are 
demarcated. All such parts of trees are either instances of some Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, or they 
can be decomposed into a finite number of parts, each of which satisfies this condi-
tion. Examples of universals Ui within the granularity of the tree context would be 
branch of a tree, leaf of a tree, trunk of a tree, root of a tree, and so on. 
We have the following axioms: 
∀xyU (x <u y → Univ(U) ∧ x < y) (CPW1) 
∀xyzU (x <u y ∧ y <u z → x <u z) (CPW2) 
3   Ontological Foundations of the UML 
In the sequel, we refer to the OMG UML Specification 1.4, when we cite text in italics 
using page references in the form of [p.2-31]. 
For simplicity, we simply say conceptual model when we mean a conceptual model 
of a domain in the form of a UML class model. Whenever the context is clear, we omit 
the name space prefix UML and simply say ‘object’, ‘class’, etc., instead of ‘UML 
object’, ‘UML class’, etc. 
3.1   Classes and Objects 
In the UML, “an object represents a particular instance of a class. It has identity and 
attribute values.” While in the UML objects are instances of classes, individuals are 
instances of universals in GOL. 
A “Class describes a set of Objects sharing a collection of Features, including 
Operations, Attributes and Methods, that are common to the set of Objects.” [p.2-26] 
“The model is concerned with describing the intension of the class, that is, the rules 
that define it. The run-time execution provides its extension, that is, its instances.” 
[p.3-35] Attributes come with associated data types. Since in conceptual modeling, the 
behavior of objects is normally not taken into consideration, we exclude the ‘opera-
tions’ and ‘methods’ of an object from our discussion. 
We may observe a direct correspondence between universals and classes of a cer-
tain kind, as stated in the following principles. 
 
Principle 1 (Class) In a conceptual model, any universal U of the domain may be 
represented as a concrete class CU. Conversely, for all concrete classes (of a concep-
tual model of the domain) whose instances are basic objects or links (representing 
individuals), there must be a corresponding first-order universal in the domain. 
 
Principle 2 (Attribute) If there is an elementary specification for a universal U, then 
any feature of it may be represented as an attribute of the corresponding class CU in a 
conceptual model of the domain. 
 
In a conceptual model, any individual of the domain that is an instance of a univer-
sal may be represented as an object (or link) of the class representing the universal. 
Notice that classes are not sets. In general, two classes C1 and C2 with identical exten-
sions, Ext(C1) = Ext(C2), even if they have the same set of attributes, are not equal, C1 
≠ C2. 
3.2   Powertype 
“A Powertype is a user-defined metaelement whose instances are classes in the 
model.” A powertype is a special class, designated with the stereotype ‘powertype’. It 
represents a higher-order universal of order n whose instances are universals of order 
n−1. Unfortunately, the UML does not provide higher-order ‘isInstanceOf’ relation-
ships.  
Figure 2 shows an example of a powertype represented in UML. In this figure, a 
Pigeon is a first-order universal whose instances are particular pigeons. However, 
individual breeds of birds, such as Pigeon and Peafowl, are also instances of the sec-
ond-order universal Breed. In GOL, these two instantiation relations can be repre-
sented as x::Pigeon::2Breed, where x is a particular pigeon. 
 
Fig. 2.
 Example of a second-order universal Breed represented in UML as a powertype. 
3.3   Association 
In the UML, the ER concept of a relationship type is called association. “An associa-
tion defines a semantic relationship between classifiers. The instances of an associa-
tion are a set of tuples relating instances of the classifiers. Each tuple value may 
appear at most once.” [p. 2-19] “An instance of an Association is a Link, which is a 
tuple of Instances drawn from the corresponding Classifiers.” [p. 2-20] 
The OMG UML Specification is somehow ambiguous in defining associations. An 
association is primarily considered to be a ‘connection’, but, in certain cases (when-
ever it has ‘class-like properties’), an association may be a class: “An association 
class is an association that is also a class. It not only connects a set of classifiers but 
also defines a set of features that belong to the relationship itself and not any of the 
classifiers.” [p.2-21] 
An association A between the classes C1,…,Cn of a conceptual model can be under-
stood in GOL as a relation R between the corresponding universals U1,…,Un induced 
by the relational universal whose extension consists of all relational moments corre-
sponding to the links of A. Let φ(a1,…,an) denote a condition on the individuals 
a1,…,an. Then  
[a1…an]: RA (U1…Un) ↔
 
∧i ≤ n aj::Ui ∧ φ (a1…an)  
An association is called material if there is a relator universal F such that the con-
dition φ is obtained from F as follows: 
 
φ(a1…an) ↔ ∃k (k::F ∧ h(k,a1…an) 
An example of a ternary material association is purchFrom corresponding to a rela-
tor universal Purchase whose instances are individual purchases. These individual 
purchases connect three individuals: a person, say John, an individual good, e.g. the 
book Speech Acts by Searle, and a shop, say Amazon. Thus, 
 
[John, SpeechActsBySearle, Amazon]:RpurchFrom(Person, Good, Shop)  
since John::Person, SpeechActsBySearle::Good and Amazon::Shop, and there is a 
specific purchase event p::Purchase such that 
 
h(p, John, SpeechActsBySearle, Amazon). 
We obtain the following definition for the triple [a1, a2, a3] being a link of the as-
sociation purchFrom between Person, Good and Shop: 
 
[a1,a2,a3]:RpurchFrom(Person, Good, Shop) ↔ a1::Person ∧ a2::Good ∧ 
a3::Shop ∧ ∃p (p::Purchase ∧ h(p, a1,a2,a3)  
3.4   Aggregation and Composition 
“An association may represent an aggregation; that is, a whole/part relationship. 
In this case, the association-end attached to the whole element is designated, and the 
other association-end of the association represents the parts of the aggregation. Only 
binary associations may be aggregations. Composite aggregation is a strong form of 
aggregation, which requires that a part instance be included in at most one composite 
at a time and that the composite object has sole responsibility for the disposition of its 
parts. This means that the composite object is responsible for the creation and de-
struction of the parts. In implementation terms, it is responsible for their memory 
allocation. If a composite object is destroyed, it must destroy all of its parts. It may 
remove a part and give it to another composite object, which then assumes responsi-
bility for it. If the multiplicity from a part to composite is zero-to-one, the composite 
may remove the part, and the part may assume responsibility for itself, otherwise it 
may not live apart from a composite.” [p.2-66] 
“A shareable aggregation denotes weak ownership; that is, the part may be in-
cluded in several aggregates and its owner may also change over time. However, the 
semantics of a shareable aggregation does not imply deletion of the parts when an 
aggregate referencing it is deleted. Both kinds of aggregations define a transitive, 
antisymmetry relationship; that is, the instances form a directed, non-cyclic graph. 
Composition instances form a strict tree (or rather a forest).”[p.2-67] 
A part-whole relation is by default expressed as an aggregation in the UML. Oth-
erwise, if the parts in the part-whole relation are non-shareable, then the relation is 
expressed as a composition (black-diamond) – the use of composition implies the 
maximum cardinality of 1 w.r.t. the whole. An example of part-whole relation with 
shareable parts is the relation between researchers and research groups (researchers 
can be part of several research groups) – figure 2(a) Conversely, the relation between 
a person and one of his organs is an instance of a non-shareable part-whole relation (a 
human organ cannot be shared by more than one human body). 
3.4.1 Mandatory aggregates and Mandatory parts   
Asides from the distinction between shareable and non-shareable parts, UML al-
lows to express the distinctions between mandatory and optional aggregates and be-
tween mandatory and optional parts.  
A mandatory aggregate refers to whether a part can exist without being part of an 
aggregate of certain class. This is the case, for instance, of a human heart that must be 
attached to a human body but not necessarily the same body forever. This is repre-
sented in UML by a minimum cardinality of (at least) 1 in the aggregate side. This 
example also depicts the notion of mandatory parts: refers to whether a whole can 
exist without having a part of a certain class – a human body must have a human heart 
but not necessarily the same heart for the entire life. This is represented in UML by a 
minimum cardinality of (at least) 1 in the part side of the relation. Figure 3(b) depicts 
this example as a non-shareable part-whole relation with mandatory aggregate and 
mandatory part.    
 
Fig. 3.
 A part-whole relation with sharable part; Fig 3.b part-whole relation with non-sharable 
and mandatory part and mandatory whole; Fig 3.c part-whole relation with non-sharable and 
mandatory part and optional whole. 
3.4.2 Inseparable and Essential Parts   
The concept of Inseparable parts refers to whether an object can exist without being 
part of a particular whole. UML is quite imprecise when dealing with the difference 
between Inseparable Parts and Mandatory aggregates. The specification prescribes 
that “the composite object is responsible for creation and destruction of its parts” and 
that, “if the composite is destroyed if must destroy all its parts”. Let w be a whole and 
p be one of its parts, this means that, lifetime(p) ≤ lifetime(w) and that the destruction 
of whole implies the destruction of the part.  
Lifetime dependency is a characteristic of part-whole relations with inseparable 
parts – i.e. parts that are dependent always on the same whole. In this sense, we dis-
agree with examples such as the one used in [7] to justify the existence of separable 
parts but that share same destruction as the whole: “a car wheel is independent of the 
car but if the wheel is in the car during the car’s destruction then it is also de-
stroyed”. In this case, the wheel is clearly separable from the car, it just happened to 
be the same event that caused the destruction of both objects (if the wheel was sepa-
rated from the car the car’s destruction would not propagate to the wheel). Nonethe-
less, the UML specification also states “it [the whole] may remove a part and give it 
to another composite object, which then will be responsible for it” which give us the 
clearly impression that the composition notation with one-to-one cardinality refers to 
mandatory wholes but not to inseparable parts. This is confirmed by the statement “if 
the multiplicity from the part to composite is zero-to-one, the composite may remove 
the part, and the part may assume responsibility for itself, otherwise it may not live 
apart from a composite”. In sum, the UML composition notation means: (i) zero-to-
one cardinality – non-shareable separable parts with optional aggregate – figura 3.c; 
(ii) one-to-one cardinality: non-shareable separable parts but with mandatory aggre-
gate – figura 3.b; In both cases, there is no necessary relation between the chronoids 
lifetime(p) and lifetime(w).  
We can conclude that in its current form (version 1.4), UML does not allow to ex-
press the distinctions between separable and inseparable Parts. Likewise, it also does 
not allow expressing the distinctions between essential and nonessential parts. The 
concept of essential part refers to whether an object can exist without having a 
particular object as a part. An example is relation between the car and its chassis. The 
removal of the car chassis breaks the identity criteria of the car. The human brain in 
the relation with a Person is an example of an essential part (actually this is an exam-
ple of both essential and inseparable part) – figure 4. 
In order to represent these two important ontological distinctions we therefore pro-
pose to extend UML by adding two Boolean-valued tags for the part association-end 
of an aggregation: inseparable and essential. 
 
Proposal 1 (Aggregation with Inseparable and Essential Parts)
 UML 1.4 has to be 
extended by adding two predefined Boolean-valued tags for the part association end 
of an aggregation: inseparable and essential, whose default value is false. 
A lifetime dependency between a part and a whole, referred to in the sentence “If a 
composite object is destroyed, it must destroy all of its parts” [p.2-66], is only in 
effect in the case of an inseparable part. In the case of a merely mandatory aggregate, 
it would be admissible to reassign the part when the mandatory aggregate is destroyed. 
 
Fig. 4.
 An example of a composition with parts that are inseparable and essential. 
According to the notation we propose, a composition with parts that are inseparable 
and essential would be expressed as in Fig. 4. As this example seems to suggest, one 
may be inclined to assume that an inseparable part is always non-shareable. But this is 
not the case, as the example in Fig. 5 shows.  
 Fig. 5.
 An example of an aggregation with shareable parts that are inseparable: although a 
specific lecture of a regular course is an inseparable part of that course, it may be shared with 
any number of studium generale courses. 
3.4.3 The Scope of Transitivity   
Among the primary characteristics of part-whole relations, the most discussed one is 
transitivity. In the domain of philosophy and mathematics there is almost a consensus 
that transitivity should be included in the basic axiomatization of a part-whole theory 
[1,8,9]. Likewise, in Object Oriented modeling, several authors propose transitivity as 
a primary characteristic of aggregation [10]. More specifically, In UML, “both kinds 
of aggregations define a transitive, antisymmetric relationship”. We can say, for 
example, that the hand is part of the arm, the arm is part of the human body, ergo, the 
hand is part of the human body. However, there are also various authors who claim 
that transitivity does not always hold. As an example, the brain is part of person, this 
person is part of a Research Group but it sounds strange to state that the person’s brain 
is part of the Research Group.  
On the basis of linguistic and cognitive studies, Winston, Chaffin and Herrmann 
(WCH) proposed a distinction among various sorts of part-whole relationships, with 
the aim to overcome these apparent transitivity paradoxes [11]. The main idea was 
capture the different ways in which parts contribute to the structure of the whole. This 
framework has been further refined in [12] by isolating three basic kinds of wholes: 
masses, collections and complexes (whose parts are respectively called quantities, 
members and components). Masses are homogeneous aggregates which are similar to 
its quantities (homeromeous) – e.g. an amount of sugar. Complexes are characterized 
by structural (configurational) relationships among the parts – e.g. the human body 
and its parts. Finally, in collections a part is regard not to have an essential role w.r.t. 
the whole – e.g. a tree is part of forest, a person is part of research group [7].  
In [10], it is claimed, “as long as we are careful to keep a single sense of part, it 
seems that the part-whole relation is always transitive. However, when we inadver-
tently mix different meronymic relations problems with transitivity arise”. In [7], 
Henderson-Sellers and Barbier disagree with this statement showing the following 
counter-example: “I am member of a club (collection) and my club is a member of an 
International body (collection). However, it does not follow that I am a member of 
this International body since this only has clubs as members, not individuals”.   
In the example given above, a research group is a sort of social system, i.e. an in-
stance of whole whose parts comprise a set of socially linked persons. The brains of 
such individuals are parts of the latter but do not qualify as members or components of 
a social system because they do not enter independently in social relations: only entire 
persons can enter independently in those type of social relations. In other words, the 
set of parts of a research group is not the collection of all its parts but the collection 
of its atoms, i.e. the collection of those parts that are socially coupled. This particular 
notion of atomic composition is expressed in GOL in terms of the contextual part-
whole relation. In this case, if x is part of y in context of a research group, then either 
x is an instance of the universal Person or x can be decomposed in finite parts that are 
instances of Person (e.g. a subgroup is composed of members which are instances of 
Person, thus, a subgroup can be considered a part of a research group).    
In [1] and in [13], a distinction is made between a formal part-whole relation that is 
unrestrictedly transitive and material part-whole relations whose transitivity is scoped 
to a certain context. Moreover, according to [13], absolute transitivity is a characteris-
tic that only makes sense in a mathematical perspective, for the axiomatic definition of 
the theory. In the ontological and cognitive sense, part-whole relations should only be 
interpreted w.r.t. a certain context.  
The distinction between formal and material (contextual) part-whole relations 
seems to be a much more elegant solution to the apparent transitivity paradox – transi-
tivity always holds for contextual part-whole relations (axiom CPW2). We therefore 
propose to add the concept of a contextual part-whole relation, as described in section 
2.5, to the UML. For defining the context of such a relation, we propose to use the 
UML construct of a package. 
 
Proposal 2 (Contextual Aggregation)
 UML 1.4 has to be extended by adding a con-
textual aggregation construct. Such an aggregation is defined within a package, and 
any part class participating in it must also be in that package. Transitivity, then, only 
holds between the contextual aggregations within a package, but not across packages. 
 
 
Fig. 6.
 The same individual researcher participating in different contextual part-whole rela-
tions. 
4   Related Work 
The upper level ontology of GOL is under development at the Institute for Formal 
Ontology and Medical Information Science at the University of Leipzig, Germany. 
The project is a collaboration between philosophers, linguists and other cognitive 
scientists and computer and information scientists. For a comparison between GOL an 
other upper-level ontologies, such as the IEEE Standard Upper Ontology [14], KIF 
[15], Sowa [16], Russel and Norvig [17] and LADSEB [18,19], one should refer to 
[1]. 
The goal of this paper is to use the upper level ontology of GOL to analyze the on-
tological correctness of a conceptual UML class models and to develop guidelines that 
assign well-defined ontological semantics to UML constructs. For this reason, we limit 
our discussion of related work w.r.t. this point .     
 The approach found in the literature that is closest to the one presented here is the 
approach by Evermann and Wand [20] and, Weber, Storey and Weber [21]. In these 
two articles, the authors report their results in mapping common constructs of concep-
tual modeling to an upper level ontology. Their approach is based on the BWW ontol-
ogy, a framework created by Wand and Weber on the basis of the original metaphysi-
cal theory developed by Mario Bunge in [8] and [13].  
The concepts of substance (in GOL) and of thing in BWW are both based on the 
Aristotelian idea of substance: (i) an essence which makes a thing what it is; (ii) that 
which remains the same through changes; (iii) that which can exist by itself, i.e., which 
does not need a ‘subject’ in order to exist. In [20], it is proposed that “only substantial 
entities in the world are modeled as objects” (Rule 1). As a direct consequence, 
classes in UML should only represent universals that denote substances. Conversely, 
in our approach, concrete classes can represent any type of universals. In [20], instan-
tiation relations of higher-order are not considered, therefore, no guideline for the 
UML concept of powertype is provided.      
In BWW, a thing has necessarily at least one property. Likewise, a property exists 
only in connection with things. A property whose existence depends only on a single 
thing is called an intrinsic property (e.g. the height of a person). A property that de-
pends on two or more things is called a mutual property (e.g. being a student is a mu-
tual property between a person and an educational institution). Again the concepts of 
BWW’s intrinsic and mutual properties can be directly related to the concepts of qual-
ity and relational moments in GOL. Nevertheless, in BWW only things possess prop-
erties. As a consequence, a property cannot have properties. This dictum leads to the 
following modeling principle: “Associations should not be modeled as classes”, (Rule 
7) in [20]. Contrary to this principle, GOL allows associations, representing relational 
universals, to have attributes and to participate in second or higher-order associations. 
Thus, while the BWW approach prohibits to use association classes in conceptual 
modeling, they are allowed in GOL. 
In [22], Opdahl et al. uses BWW ontology as a foundation for a conceptual frame-
work defining a taxonomy of part-whole relations in terms of its primary (e.g. reflex-
ivity, asymmetry and transitivity), secondary (shareability, mutability, separability, 
etc…) and consequent properties (e.g. ownership, propagation of operations, encapsu-
lation). Moreover, the article analyses the different kinds of part-whole relations in 
terms of ontological expressiveness, i.e., if the proposed concepts are meaningful in 
terms of real-world semantics. Finally, some UML stereotypes are proposed in order 
to provide syntactical representations to the proposed ontological distinctions.  
In our approach we are interested on those properties that have meaning in terms of 
ontological correspondence. For that reason, we have chose to ignore properties that 
are relevant only in terms of implementation decision (e.g. ownership, propagation of 
operations, encapsulation, by-value or by-reference, used or not used). In terms of the 
primary characteristics of part-whole relations there are two points of disagreement 
between the two proposals:  
 
Transitivity: Opdahl et. al. claim that transitivity is valid only for certain types of 
relation and, thus, should not be considered as a primary characteristic. As we have 
discussed in section 3.4, proposal 2, both in the ontological and cognitive sense, part-
whole relations should only be interpreted w.r.t. a certain context. Moreover, contex-
tual part-whole relations are always transitive. In our approach we, thus, consider 
transitivity w.r.t. a certain context as a primary characteristic of part-whole relations.   
 
Emergent and Resultant properties: both in [21] and [22] it is proposed that a thing 
should only be modeled as an aggregate if we are interested in modeling its emergent 
and resultant properties. In [22], it is presented a UML class diagram with the classes 
Department and Employee. In this example they state that in the problem domain all 
Departments are aggregates of Employees. However, it is claimed unacceptable to add 
a part-whole between these two classes since the diagram would comprise no resul-
tant/emergent property of Department relative to Employee. We strongly disagree 
with this view and we thing that this restriction arises from a misinterpretation of 
Bunge’s ontology. According to Bunge, every aggregate will certainly have emergent 
and resultant properties. However, it is important to notice that his Ontology makes 
explicit the distinction between the properties possessed by a thing and the representa-
tions of these properties, namely attributes. According to Bunge, there are no bare 
individuals, i.e., things without properties: a thing posses at least one substantial prop-
erty, even if we humans are not or cannot be aware of them. Humans get in contact 
with the properties of things exclusively via the things attributes, i.e. via a chosen 
representational view of its properties. In sum, we agree that emergent/resultant prop-
erties are basic characteristics of part-whole relations, in the sense they are present in 
all of them. What we do not agree is to use the existence of resultant/emergent attrib-
utes as a criteria for representation of part-whole relationships. In other words, these 
properties will always exist but we do not have always to be interested in them and 
sometimes we cannot even be aware of them. Additionally, we think that the represen-
tation of these attributes is not a necessary condition for one to benefit from the repre-
sentation of part-whole relations in terms of communicability, understanding and 
problem-solving.    
5   Conclusions 
The development of a well-grounded, axiomatized upper level ontology is an im-
portant step towards the definition of real-world semantics for conceptual modeling 
diagrammatic languages. In this paper we use the General Ontological Language 
(GOL) and its underlying upper level ontology to evaluate the ontological correctness 
of UML as a conceptual modeling language. Moreover, we develop guidelines that 
assign well-defined ontological semantics to UML constructs. In particular, we have 
focused on the UML metaconcepts of classes and objects, powertypes, association 
and part-whole relations (aggregation/composition).  
Except from the distinction between shareable and non-shareable parts, the UML 
allows to express the distinctions between mandatory and optional aggregates and 
between mandatory and optional parts. However, in its current form (UML 1.4), it 
does not allow to express the distinctions between separable and inseparable parts, 
and between essential and nonessential parts. We therefore propose some extensions 
to version 1.4 of the UML in order to obtain a more satisfactory treatment of part-
whole relations. Additionally, we define in terms of GOL’s contextual part-whole 
relation: (i) a solution to the transitivity paradox of part-whole relations; (ii) a repre-
sentation of contextual part-whole relations in UML.    
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